Abstract: It is frequently assumed that a cultural group can own cultural property that have been created in the past. It is less clear what grounds this assumption, and even less clear when the assumption is made regarding property that was created in distant past. How can such cultural objects become the property of a particular culture, especially in those cases where there is a clear lack of cultural continuity? This question is important for a number of prevalent debates on cultural repatriation. According to one position found in the philosophical debate on cultural repatriation, a legitimate claim to cultural property can be grounded in the fact that the property in question has great value to the members of a specific cultural group. This view is captured by the so-called cultural significance principle, which states that the greater the cultural significance of a cultural artefact is to a specific cultural group, the greater is this group’s claim to ownership over it. In this paper I critically assess the CSP in the context of cultural repatriation. In doing so I discuss some objections that have been raised against it. I suggest that while some initial challenges can be meet, important objections remain. I then criticize James O Young’s defense of the principle. In conclusion, I argue that even if the appeal tocultural significance is indeed relevant in the philosophical debates on cultural repatriation, the appeal to the CSP is not.