Truth, Vagueness and Restricted Quantification


There are strong pressures to restrict classical logic in connection with notions like truth (in "paradoxical constructions" such as Liar sentences), and to a lesser extent in connection with vagueness. But what is the non-classical logic to be like? A hitherto under-appreciated problem is to get a logic that adequately deals with restricted quantification. The standard logics of vagueness, and previous work by myself and others on the logic of the paradoxes, all fail miserably on restricted quantification. About half the talk will be a review of some motivations for going non-classical on these problems; the rest will be on the special problems posed by restricted quantification, with a gesture toward a solution. (I do have a solution, available on my website for anyone interested ("Naive Truth and Restricted Quantification: Saving Truth a Whole Lot Better"), but it is rather technical and I won’t give very much detail about it in the lecture.)

There will be a reception after the talk in D700.



Hartry Field (homepage) is Silver Professor of Philosophy and University Professor at New York University (NYU). He specializes in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of science.