The standard approach to permission in deontic logic takes “p is permitted” to be true if and only if p is true in some ideal world. However, this construct gives rise to the problem of free choice permissions. This problem stems from the intuition that “You may go by bus and you may go by train” can be inferred from “You may go by bus or by train”. This inference is, however, not valid in the standard approach.

Simons suggests solving the problem of free choice permissions by introducing a distribution requirement, guaranteeing that disjunctive permissions are true only if there are ideal worlds in both disjuncts. While Simons’ idea does well for disjunctions in the scope of deontic modals, interpreting non-modalized “or”-sentences turns out to be problematic. It is also not clear how to develop a full formal semantics based on the idea.

I will argue that the problems can be solved by introducing a distinction between propositional statements and action expressions. By extending a deontic action logic with Simons’ ideas, different logical behavior is assigned to the two kinds of expressions. I will also develop a full formal semantics and discuss its axiomatization.