Is there a relevant difference between a case of reaction qualification, in which one’s skin colour (say: being white) counts as an employment qualification (e.g. for serving a racist community), and a case of affirmative action, in which one’s skin colour (say: being black) counts as an employment qualification (e.g. for achieving work place diversity)? Could any such difference help explain why one, but possibly not the other, constitutes wrongful discrimination? In this article, I examine a recent account of discrimination and its wrong-making feature, in harm-based terms. I show that this proposal draws counterintuitive conclusions in the abovementioned cases, and point out additional problems stemming from the orthodox concept of harm it presupposes. In the light of this criticism, I propose an improved account of discrimination and its wrong-making feature, which relies on a non-orthodox – but even elsewhere proposed – hybrid concept of harm. I argue that the improved account provides us with better resources to understand our intuitions concerning, and to address the injustices underlying, these two cases.