Abstract: Explanatory naturalism holds that there is no normativity in the explanatory portfolio of the social sciences. (There is room for variation in the strength of naturalist positions, as normativity might be excluded variously from explananda or explanans.) Normativism holds that normatively is within the social scientific portfolio. (Although again there are variations to be considered.) Focusing on how to think of the explanatory place of norms, I support explanatory naturalism. Of course, the naturalist recognize that it can be explanatorily important that folk's thinking have normative content. What is at issue is the explanatory place, if any, of real normatively (real correctness, goodness, rightness, rationality, Š Choose your normative modality). I sort out various versions of both naturalism and normativism, with attention to meta-normativity (generalizations of meta-ethical positions to normativity generally). I argue that real normativity clearly should not serve as social scientific explanans. I pursue the more delicate issues of whether normative properties and normatively infused activitites/entities might serve as explananda. Without seeking a fully decisive verdict, I suggest that certain moderate positions are likely not workable, and that one must choose between more extreme positions.

David Henderson is Robert R Chambers Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at University of Nebraska. Visit Henderson's website for more information.