

Reading List

First Meeting

1. Gettier, Edmund (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? *Analysis* 23 (6):121-123.

Second Meeting

2. Saul A. Kripke (2011). *Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I.* Oxford University Press. **Chapter 2**
3. Willard V. O. Quine (1953). On a So-Called Paradox. *Mind* 62 (245):65-67.

Third Meeting

4. Timothy Williamson (2000). *Knowledge and its Limits.* Oxford University Press. **Chapter 5**
5. Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (2008). Mr. magoo's mistake. *Philosophical Studies* 139 (2): 289 - 306.

Fourth Meeting

6. Saul A. Kripke (2011). *Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I.* Oxford University Press. **Chapter 2**
7. Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Dogmatism, junk knowledge, and conditionals. *Philosophical Quarterly* 38 (153): 433-454.

Fifth Meeting

8. Saul A. Kripke (ed.) (2011). *Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I.* Oxford University Press. **Chapter 7**
9. John Hawthorne (2004). *Knowledge and Lotteries.* Oxford University Press. **Chapter 1**

Sixth Meeting

10. John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2009). Knowledge and Objective Chance. In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), *Williamson on Knowledge.* Oxford University Press.
11. Timothy Williamson (2009). Reply to John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio. In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), *Williamson on Knowledge.* Oxford University Press.

12. Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (2012). Epistemic closure under deductive inference: what is it and can we afford it?. *Synthese*, 1-18.

Seventh Meeting

13. Adam Elga (2000). Self-locating belief and the sleeping beauty problem. *Analysis* 60 (2): 143–147.

14. David Lewis (2001). Sleeping beauty: Reply to Elga. *Analysis* 61 (3):171–76.

15. Karl Karlander & Levi Spectre (2010). Sleeping beauty meets monday. *Synthese* 174 (3).

Eighth Meeting

16. Timothy Williamson (2013). Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. *Inquiry*, 56(1), 1-14.

17. Cohen, S., & Comesaña, J. (2013). Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic. *Inquiry*, 56(1), 15-29.

18. Timothy Williamson (2013). Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. *Inquiry*, 56(1), 15-29.