Many connections may be drawn between normativity and the a priori. First, that something is knowable a priori might be said to have normative implications: if it is a priori that p, then one is always permitted to believe that p, come what may; if it is a priori that q follows from p, then one is always permitted to infer q from p. Second, these connections might be said to be constitutive: what it is to know a priori that p is to be governed by a rule that permits one to believe that p; what it is to know a priori that q follows from p is to be governed by a rule that permits one to infer q from p. Third, certain kinds of knowledge that are traditionally thought to be a priori—such as knowledge of logic, modality or concepts—might be said in some sense to be normative. It is a familiar view that logic is normative, that reasoning involves rule following, that modal knowledge involves ideal, rational reflection, or that grasp of a concept involves norms of thought. 

These reflections raise a host of questions. First and foremost is whether any of these connections hold: Does a priority carry normative implications? Are these constitutive of a priority? Is knowledge of logic, modality, or concepts normative? If a priority is in some sense normative, then this raises several further meta-normative questions: are normative statements true in a robust, non-deflationary sense? Do they serve to represent how things are? Are there normative facts or properties? 

How we answer these questions will have implications for the range of uses to which the notion of a priority is put. For instance, many find an anti-realism about normativity attractive, holding that there are no robust normative facts or properties in the world. Yet, if logic is normative, then this implies that there are no logical facts either—a view which some might find objectionable. Similarly, anti-realism about normativity may have implications for modal rationalism, the view that knowledge of metaphysical modality is a priori.

The workshop is funded by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond project 'The foundations of epistemic normativity'.