Monday 4 June, 10 am – 5 pm in room D397, Frescati Campus

First paper

Daniel Star (Boston) "Practical Reasons, Evidence, and Authority"

Commentator: Frans Svensson (Stockholm)

Second paper

Ebba Gullberg (Umeå): "On an Apparent Conflict in the Philosophy of Mathematics"

Abstract: Ontological realists about mathematics argue that the existence of abstract mathematical objects follows from the fact that there are true mathematical existence statements. The claim that if mathematical existence statements are true, then there are mathematical objects, is also accepted by fictional- ists. However, since fictionalists deny the existence of mathematical objects, they also deny that there are true mathematical existence statements. It thus seems as if ontological realism and fictionalism about mathematics are two diametrically opposed, incompatible positions. In this paper, I argue that the notions of mathematical existence and mathematical truth can be reasonably interpreted in such a way that what prima facie appears to be a fundamental disagreement between ontological realists on the one hand and fictionalists on the other hand concerning the nature of mathematics and mathematical discourse, boils down to being two very different ways of describing two very similar standpoints.

Commentator: Henrik Rydéhn (Uppsala)

Third paper

Björn Brunnander (Stockholm): "What is the Problem of Evolutionary Altruism?"
Björn Brunnander - What is the Problem of Evolutionary Altruism? (183 Kb)

Abstract: This paper addresses the "problem of altruism" within evolutionary theory. An alternative conceptualisation is presented in order to show that standard presentations of the matter are slightly off the mark in some respects: They draw the line between evolutionary models in the wrong place, they produce odd anachronisms by presenting the matter from within a superseded position, and they promote theoretically ungrounded verdicts to the effect that altruism is merely apparent. It is suggested that the discourse suffers from "terminologically driven" distorting pre-theoretical influence, and that an alternative framework therefore might be useful.

Commentator: Emma Wallin (Stockholm)

Fourth paper

Sofia Jeppsson (Stockholm): "Deontic Morality and Ought implies Can"

Commentator: Victor Moberger (Uppsala)

 Fifth paper

Uri Leibowitz (Nottingham): "Moral Deliberation and Ad Hominem Fallacies"

Commentator: Sara Packalén (Stockholm)