Abstract: According to utilitarianism, and other ‘total’ views, for any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, constituting the A-world, there must be some much larger imaginable population, constituting the Z-world, whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. Derek Parfit has nick-named this implication from total views the ‘repugnant’ conclusion. Parfit seems to have taken the intuition that the Z world is worse than the A world as evidence against total theories. But should we trust this intuition? There are several strategies aimed at debunking this intuition. If they succeed we should not consider the content of this intuition, even if it stays, as evidence against the total views. And the debunking strategies do indeed succeed. In particular, this seems to be true when we consider the principle of unrestricted instantiation, according to which any instantiation of the repugnant conclusion must appear repugnant if we should be warranted in relying  on it as evidence against utilitarianism. However, there are instantiations of the conclusion where it doesn’t seem to be at all repugnant. Even Parfit admitted that. This means that there is nothing repugnant about the repugnant conclusion as such. The faults with utilitarianism Parfit though he had exposed in his examination of the repugnant conclusion have nothing to do with large numbers or with the conclusion as such. It is possible, if you like, to correct these putative faults even if you adopt some total view (different from utilitarianism).