Abstract: Ethical pluralism – the generic view for which Ross’s theory of prima facie duties is the classical example – is often criticised for providing neither principles of weighing for cases of conflict, nor a unified normative rationale for the plurality of irreducible morally relevant factors that obtain according to the pluralist claim. In this paper, I defend ethical pluralism by showing that structural properties such as those on grounds of which pluralism is often found wanting are far less relevant for theory choice in ethics than is commonly believed. This bears not only on the assessment of ethical pluralism, but on what to expect from ethical theories quite generally. The crucial building block of my argument is a defence of the claim that, contrary to the standard view in the literature, the properties of ethical pluralism that might make it seem structurally unappealing – i.e. its indeterminacy and its (alleged) lack of normative unity – are independent from one another and do not necessarily coincide. With this result in place, I show that it is hard to see how determinacy could ever to be a dialectically relevant difference between two ethical theories.