ABSTRACT: Recent proposals by normative decision theorists suggest that an agent’s rational preference is determined not only by their utility and probability function but also by a risk function which represents their attitude to risk itself. The introduction of this additional function into normative decision theory raises the question which attitude to risk one should take when deciding for oneself and, more importantly, when deciding for others. Lara Buchak argues that when choosing for another individual, a decision-maker should choose with the most risk-avoidant attitude within reason. I want to raise some doubts about the general applicability of the Risk Principle. The Risk Principle is motivated by the ambition to improve the worst possible outcome. With such a prioritarian motivation, the Risk Principle will in many cases require a rejection of risk-taking. However, this requirement might be difficult to accept in situations in which risk-taking is the only option to escape destitution. I will explore whether a morally motivated decision-maker may choose with a risk-inclined attitude in cases in which the individual for whom he is choosing is below a certain threshold and risk-taking offers a chance to bring the individual up to or above this threshold.