According to the Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, the norms by which everyday human cognition is best evaluated are probabilistic rather than logical in character. In this talk, I extend the Bayesian approach to rationality to the domain of argumentation, where the fundamental norms are standardly assumed to be logical. In particular, I present a general Bayesian theory of argumentation that (i) is well supported by recent advances in the psychology of reasoning, (ii) is able to characterise the special value of logically valid argument schemes in uncertain contexts, and (iii) captures the inherently dynamic nature of argumentation. I conclude that the probabilistic norms given by the Bayesian approach to rationality are not necessarily at odds with the norms given by classical logic. Rather, the Bayesian theory of argumentation presented here can be seen as justifying and enriching the argumentative norms of classical logic.

The talk is based on joint work with Ben Eva (Konstanz).

As usual, there will be a reception in D700 afterwards.

Stephan Hartman
Stephan Hartman

Stephan Hartmann (Münich)

Stephan Hartmann is Professor of Philosophy of Science in the Faculty of Philosophy. His primary research and teaching areas are philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, formal epistemology, and social epistemology. He published numerous articles and the book Bayesian Epistemology (2003, OUP).His current research interests include formal social epistemology (especially models of deliberation, norm emergence, and pluralistic ignorance), the philosophy and psychology of reasoning, intertheoretic relations, and (imprecise) probabilities in quantum mechanics. He is also working on the book Bayesian Philosophy of Science (with Jan Sprenger). Read more at: www.stephanhartmann.org