10:00–11:15 Andreas Stokke, Uppsala: Navigation and Indexical Thought
Comments by Hana Möller Kalpak, Stockholm.

11:30–12:45 Staffan Carlshamre, Stockholm: The Epistemology of Stories
Comments by Jeremy Page, Uppsala.

 

Andreas Stokke: Navigation and Indexical Thought

Abstract
This paper argues for a moderate form of essentialism about indexical (also known asde se, first-person, or egocentric) thought. It is argued that there is a significant category of intentional action that necessarily involves indexical thought. This category of action is navigation, that is, intentionally moving from one place to another by using a particular kind of information about the world. I show that that anti-essentialists cannot account for this kind of action without accepting that it necessarily involves indexical thought or something equivalent. The conclusion that navigation necessarily requires indexical thought is neutral on the strong essentialist claim that there is a special class of indexical propositional attitudes that mandate rejecting standard theories of propositional attitudes. The conclusion is also neutral on the strong essentialist claim that any kind of intentional action necessarily requires indexical thought.

 

Staffan Carlshamre: The Epistemology of Stories

Abstract
Recent decades has seen an explosion of interest in stories and narratives, within different academic disciplines as well as in society at large, but less so from philosophers. Generally speaking, the emphasis has been on the power of stories, on what stories can do for us and on what they do with us. Narratives, we are told, organise and make sense of experience, they guide and channel actions, they even bring things into being and sustain them in their existence. But another aspect of narratives that has received comparatively little interest is what I will call the cognitive value of stories. To be sure, we readily dismiss some stories as biased, misleading or outright false, but what are the grounds of such judgements? And how should we characterise the ideal that stories that are lacking in such respects fall short of: what is it for a story to be true and unbiased? I will concentrate on factually true stories, i.e., on stories that purport to be about some real occurrence and gives only correct information about it.