Nils Franzén: Evaluative discourse and emotive states of mind

Expressivists maintain that evaluative discourse expresses desire-like states of mind in a similar way to how ordinary descriptive language expresses beliefs. Conjoining an ordinary assertion that p with the denial of being in the corresponding belief-state that p famously gives rise to Moorean infelicity:

(1) # It’s raining but I don’t believe that it’s raining.

If the expressivist is right, conjoining evaluative discourse with the denial of being in the desire-like state of mind that is presumably expressed by such discourse, should give rise to similar infelicity. As several theorists have pointed out, this does not seem to be the case:

(2) Murder is wrong but I don’t disapprove of it.

In this talk, I argue that evaluative discourse expresses the kind of states that are attributed by ‘find’- constructions in English (corresponding to ‘tycka’ in Swedish), and that these states are non-cognitive in nature. This addresses the problem of missing Moorean infelicity for expressivism, and it also tells us some interesting things about evaluative discourse in general.


Eric Johannesson: Are classical statisticians Dutch-bookable?

In statistics, there are two competing paradigms: classical and Bayesian statistics. A notorious problem with the Bayesian approach is the choice of prior credences. Classical statistics is, in a sense, an attempt to factor them out. A problematic consequence of this approach is its limited applicability. Another problem is how to interpret the classical notions (such as significance levels or confidence levels) in terms of evidential support. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which classicists and Bayesians can (in some suitable sense of the word) agree. My conclusion is that, in certain situations, they can't. The upshot is that the classicist, insofar as his betting on hypotheses is constrained by the results of his statistical methods, is Dutch-bookable.