The Stockholm-Uppsala Joint Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy

6 November 2015
Engelska Parken 2-1077
Uppsala University

Valentin Goranko: A logical approach to multi-agent visual-epistemic reasoning
Comments by Sten Lindström

Anna Petronella Foultier: Bodily Reflection and Awareness: Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Dance
Comments by Ulrika Björk


Valentin Goranko
Title: A logical approach to multi-agent visual-epistemic reasoning

In this talk I will discuss logic-based reasoning evolving from the interaction between knowledge and visual information that agents receive and process. In particular, I will present a logical framework based on multi-agent systems where each agent receives visual information from the environment (via camera with a given sector of vision,  turning in the plane). The agents can thus observe their surroundings and each other and can reason about each other’s observation abilities and knowledge derived from these observations. I will introduce a suitable multi-modal logical language for formalising such reasoning,  will present formal semantics for it based on several types of visual-epistemic models, and will discuss their expressiveness and some essential validities.

This talk is partly based on a recently published joint paper with Olivier Gasquet (Univ. Paul Sabatier, IRIT, Toulouse) and Franois Schwarzentruber (ENS Rennes).

The paper is rather technical, but in the talk I will present only the bare minimum of technicalities and will focus on conceptual and modelling problems arising in the area. 


Anna Petronella Foultier
Title: Bodily Reflection and Awareness: Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Dance

In the field of dance research, the belief has been prevalent that the phenomenological method, although fruitful at the outset, is questionable due to the reifying tendency of reflection. For this reason, we risk misunderstanding the pre-reflective level of dance and movement (see e.g. Legrand and Ravn 2009, Ravn 2009, Rothfield 2005, Sheets-Johnstone 1979). In fact, this presupposition seems to go hand in hand with the “maxim” identified by Barbara Montero (2010, 2013), according to which “bodily awareness tends to hinder highly accomplished bodily skills” (Montero 2010, 106). In other words, reflection is presumed to be an obstacle both to the performance and the theoretical clarification of dance. I argue in this paper that there is undoubtedly a form of phenomenological reflection that is not necessarily reifying, and that it does not go against a theoretical understanding of the particular bodily awareness that is at play in dance and movement. Especially in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy a bodily reflection of sorts can be identified, akin to his notion of radical reflection. Even though the art of dance was never in his focus, notions such as motor intentionality, the corporeal schema – developed further by Shaun Gallagher (1986, 1995, 2005) among others – as well as the phenomenon of reversibility seminal to his later thought, can be of great utility for a phenomenology of dance disembarrassed of the dualistic tendencies still at work in dance research.


Matti Eklund
Peter Pagin