What should be salient to us? What should we notice? What should we pay attention to? Normative questions like these are central to our individual and public lives. They are questions about **priority norms**. In this paper, we present a framework for the discussion of priority norms. We have two main goals. First, we argue that priority norms are norms that apply to priority **structures**. In previous work, one of us has argued that priority structure is a fundamental and irreducible structure of the mind that cross-cuts the usual divisions between the perceptual and cognitive, the cognitive and conative, or the intellectual and the practical (Watzl «Structuring Mind», OUP, in Press). Priority structure consists in an ordering among the parts of a subject’s mind (thoughts, percepts, emotions, …) by how much they are prioritized at any given time (synchronic priority structures) and how they evolve over time (diachronic priority structures). Questions about priority norms, we suggest, are normative questions about those priority structures. Second, we argue that priority norms cannot be easily reduced to other norms that philosophers have investigated, such as epistemic norms, prudential norms or moral norms. We argue that not all priority norms are prudential (there is more than "prioritize what gets you where you want to be”), that some - but not all – priority norms are epistemic (some priority structures are epistemically irrational), and that some priority norms are non-derivative (e.g. priority structures should fit what is important to understand).