Disagreement (and agreement), and in particular disagreement in areas of discourse that have been claimed to be essentially perspectival such as evaluative and normative discourse, has become a key issue in the debate between contextualists, relativists and objectivists. These three views account for disagreement in terms of the content and/or truth-value of the judgements of the disagreeing parties. All three views face serious problems and as a reaction to this there is a growing literature on non-content-based theories of disagreement, i.e. theories that account for either the apparent disagreement or the apparent dependence on perspective in terms of something other than the content or truth-value of the speakers' judgements. 

In this talk I do three things. (1) I argue that none of the existing content-based accounts of disagreement gives a satisfactory account of perspectival disagreement, and that all of them need to be supplemented with some non-content based account. (2) I survey three of the main non-content based accounts of disagreement: The epistemic account, the attitude account, and the metalinguistic account. (3) I argue that the metalinguistic account has the best chance of succeeding.