For thousands of years philosophers have discussed the question of whether numbers exist. But, surprisingly, there are easy arguments from commonly accepted truths that seem to decide the question. For instance, it is commonly accepted that 'Obama has two hands' is true. If this sentence is true, then 'The number of Obama’s hands is two' is true as well. The latter sentence is an identity sentence that can only be true if numbers exist. Thus, numbers exist! If such arguments were convincing, ontological disputes about the existence of numbers could be decided simply by pointing to Obama’s hands! However, some authors have argued that easy arguments rely on a mistaken assumption: that the pertinent number sentences are identity sentences. A particular line of such a rebuttal of easy arguments relies on the observation that the pertinent number sentences exhibit focus effects. This, so the line of argument goes, shows that they are specificational sentences rather than identity sentences. In my talk I will defend this line of argument against a recent challenge. Jefferson Barlew has provided linguistic data to support the claim that the pertinent number sentences do not exhibit focus effects in easy argument contexts and, thus, function as identity sentences in such contexts. I will argue that the linguistic data he provides may be correct but they still fail to establish the claim in question. Thus, a rebuttal of easy arguments that is based on the focus effects of number sentences remains untouched.