We know that newborns are awake, attentive and responsive to features in the environment. But are they having subjective experience?  Two questions about infant consciousness are especially central.  First: are infants conscious?  Second: what is infants’ experience like?   These are fundamental questions to be answered if we aim to understand the infant mind.  They raise important epistemological problems that are closely related to the traditional problem of other minds. 

In this paper, I will argue that newborn babies are conscious at birth and that it is possible to know something about what infants’ experiences are like. I will propose a methodology for investigating infant consciousness, and I will present two approaches to determining whether infants are conscious.  First, I will consider behavioral signs of consciousness.  I will present two behavior-based arguments for consciousness: an argument from pain behavior, and an argument from flexible behavior.  Second, I will investigate the major theories of consciousness, including both philosophical and scientific theories, and I will discuss what they predict about infant consciousness. Finally, I will investigate the phenomenal structure of infant consciousness.  I will discuss whether infants have sensory phenomenology, cognitive phenomenology, imaginative phenomenology, emotional phenomenology, and agentive phenomenology.