According to normative realism, there are objective facts about what is right and wrong, what we ought to do, and what we have reason to do. According to normative nihilism there are no such facts. A critique that realists increasingly have directed against nihilism is that nihilism has implausible implications in unforeseen areas, concerning for example prudence, knowledge, deliberation, speech, love, politics, and the meaning of life. Although some of these objections have been discussed previously, there are significant gaps in the literature on these issues. The aim of the project is to fill these gaps.

The project has two parts, reflecting two different versions of the critique in question. One version points to conceptual implications of nihilism itself. The first part of the project aims to defend nihilism against this kind of critique. Jonas Olson will here defend an error-theoretic view, on which nihilism renders our normative judgements uniformly false, while Victor Moberger will defend a non-cognitivist view, on which normative judgements are primarily emotional states and thus are not falsified by nihilism. Another version of the critique points instead to what would transpire should nihilism become widely adopted. In the second part of the project, Nicolas Olsson Yaouzis will take on critique of this kind in connection with a discussion of what kinds of responses the adoption of nihilism calls for in different areas, particularly in political contexts.