Abstract: In a recent article, Torbjörn Tännsjö argues that utilitarianism is intuitively more plausible than prioritarianism.  According to Tännsjö, the main intuitive disadvantage of prioritarianism (relative to utilitarianism) is that it implies that it can be morally better not to live a life that is worth living from a prudential point of view.  According to Tännsjö’s conception of prudence, a life is worth living from a prudential point of view if and only if it contains a net surplus of happiness.  Building on the work of Derek Parfit, I propose an alternative view of when a life is worth living from a prudential point of view.  I call this alternative Parfitianism.  I argue that if Parfitianism is correct, then utilitarianism—like prioritarianism—implies that it can be morally better not to live a life that is worth living from a prudential point of view.  In this respect, Parfitianism undercuts the main support for Tännsjö’s claim that utilitarianism is intuitively more plausible than prioritarianism.