Abstract
It appears that consciousness science is progressing deeply, especially in its search for the neural correlates of consciousness (the NCC). Can contemporary research on the NCC give us a new understanding of the difference between cognitive machinery and the phenomenal flow of consciousness?
          There are two main approaches to solving this problem, one is functional-based (focusing on the assumption of eliminative materialism: that consciousness can be reduced to our cognitive functions), the other is state-based (focusing on the assumption that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility). From a conceptual point of view both approaches are problematic: the functional-based approach seems to set aside such crucial aspects of consciousness as its phenomenology; and the state-based approach seems to overestimate first-person conscious experience in trying to demonstrate that the core neural bases for phenomenal consciousness and for access consciousness are located in anatomically separate regions of our brain. I will discuss the line of argumentation of both approaches in order to see whether the experimental paradigms in a search for the NCC bring new light to the fundamental difference between cognitive machinery and the phenomenal flow of consciousness