Program

Wednesday, 17 May

Aula Magna: Bergsmannen
10:00-11:15

Odours, sense data and the status of philosophical theories of perception

Louise Richardson

11:15-12:30

Can we explain the phenomenology of visual experiences from their contents alone?

Madeleine Hyde

Lunch (own arrangements)
14:00-15:15

Representationalism and the experience of pain

Jonathan Egeland Harouny

Coffee
15:45-17:00

What do intuitions represent?

Slawa Loev

17:00-18:15

Stalnaker on the nature of belief

Eric Johannesson

18:30 Meeting of the Diaphora Board

Thursday, 18 May

Aula Magna: Bergsmannen
10:00-11:15

Metalinguistic Discourse, Presupposition and Context

Josep Macià

11:15-12:30

Assertion and Propositional Unity

Manuel García-Carpintero

Lunch (own arrangements)
14:00-15:15

Between Structuralism and Functionalism: A Syncretic Account of Scientific Representation

José Díez

Coffee
15:45-17:00

Realism and Non-Factive Understanding

Matthew Slater (Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium)

17:00-18:15 Panel Discussion
19:00 Workshop dinner at Värdshuset Kräftan (for speakers and Diaphora members)

Friday, 19 May

Södra Huset D, 7th floor, room D734
10-12 Training Day for ESRs: Conference Organization (closed session)

 

Abstracts


Louise Richardson
Odours, sense data and the status of philosophical theories of perception

Because awareness of odours mediates olfactory perception of other things, Sense Data Theory looks, superficially, to be a better fit for smell than it does for sight. My first aim is to propose a view of odours on which this appearance of fit is not superficial. On this view, odours have sense data-like features and play a sense data-like role. If this view were accepted, we would have reason to believe that different philosophical theories of perception apply to different varieties of perception. My second aim is to briefly consider the consequences of allowing that perception is in this way not a unitary phenomenon, and some ways those consequences might be avoided.

 

Madeleine Hyde
Can we explain the phenomenology of visual experiences from their contents alone?

I will highlight and dispute a basic thesis underlying Representationalist views of visual experiences, regarding the special link identified between the representational contents of experiences and their phenomenal character.

 

Jonathan Egeland Harouny
Representationalism and the experience of pain

I will argue that although representationalism appears to be the most promising approach for accounting for the experience of pain, its most salient theories all face unresolved problems.

 

Slawa Loev
What do intuitions represent?

Most philosophical theorists of intuitions take intuitions to have a propositional representational format, that is, intuitions have a propositional content similiar to beliefs (and, under some descriptions, perception). I want to re-examine this assumption and contemplate on the possibility that, on some plausible account of intuitions, the representational format of intuitions should rather be construed in parallel with feelings rather than beliefs (and, under some descriptions, perception). 

 

Eric Johannesson
Stalnaker on the nature of belief

There are many problems with the account of belief that Stalnaker suggests in Inquiry. In my talk, I will try to explain which is the most serious one.

 

Josep Macià
Metalinguistic Discourse, Presupposition and Context

Abtract: TBA

 


Manuel García-Carpintero
Assertion and Propositional Unity

I will discuss act-based accounts of the unity or representational character of propositional contents, critically engaging Hanks' view that unity-conferring acts should have an assertoric character.​

 

Matthew Slater
Realism and Non-Factive Understanding

I describe a prima facie problem for the Scientific Realist stemming from the growing popularity of pluralism. Drawing on recent work by Waters, Chang, and Elgin, I argue that shifting our focus from knowledge to understanding in our characterization of Scientific Realism allows for a solution to this challenge that ought to be acceptable to a (modest) realist.

 

URL: http://www.ub.edu/diaphora/events/workshop-ii/