Phone: 674 79 80
mikael.janvid@philosophy.su.se

My main area of interest is epistemology. In particular I am interested in

(i) A priori justification, i.e justifcation that is not based on experience.

(ii) Skepticism and more precisely what role underdetermination plays for the success of skeptical arguments.

(iii) Defeaters. They form the opposite side of justification by not justifying our beliefs but instead rebuting or undermining them. Whilst most existing accounts pose internalist requirement of accessibility on defeaters, I am in the process of developing an externalist account.

(iv) Understanding as a cognitive or epistemic state or ability.

Between October 2007 and September 2010 I participated in a German Research Project in Frankfurt led by Professor Marcus Willaschek with the title "Defeasability and Discourse Dependence" where I mainly worked on the part of the project that investigated a priori warrant. 

Between 2008 and 2010 I was also a member of another research project "Modern Theories of the A Priori – Criticism and Alternatives" funded by the Swedish Scientific Council.

2004-6 I pursued a research project financed by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation on "Doubting Skepticism" where I investigated contextualist, externalist and transcendental arguments against skepticism.

I wrote my dissertation on epistemological naturalism "Naturalism and the Status of Epistemology" where I discuss arguments for and against that position.

Besides epistemology I am also interested in the history of theoretical philosophy (mainly from Descartes and onwards) and the philosophy of the humanist sciences - especially assumptions concerning rationality.

Between 2002 and September 2004 I worked as a lecturer in philosophy at Linköpings universitet.

Publications

16. 2017 "Defeater goes External", Philosophia 45, 701-715.

15. 2014 "Understanding Understanding: An Epistemological Investigation", Philosophia 42, 971-985.

14. 2014 Review of The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding. Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud. Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny and Wai-Hung Wong (eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4, 145-151.

13. 2013 "The Challenges of Traveling without Itinerary. The Overriding Case", Grazer Philosophische Studien 87, 59-73.

12. 2013 Review of Essays on Skepticism by Anthony Brueckner. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, Theoria 79, 378-382.

11.  2012 "Towards a Default and Challenge Model of A Priori Warrant", Journal of Philosophical Research 37, 135-154.(pdf)

10. 2012 “Knowledge versus Understanding. The Cost of Avoiding Gettier”, Acta Analytica 27, 183-197.

9. 2010 "Empirical Indefeasibility and Nonfactuality: Assessing Field's Evaluative Approach to the A Priori", Croatian Journal of Philosophy X, 183-197.

8. 2009 "The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement", Acta Analytica 24, 263-274.(pdf)

7. 2008 "The Experiential Defeasibility and Overdetermination of A Priori Justification", Journal of Philosophical Research 33, 271-278.(pdf)

6. 2008 "Defeaters and Rising Standards of Justification", Acta Analytica 23, 45-54.(pdf)

5. 2006 "Casullo on the Nature and Existence of A Priori Justification" Review Essay of A Priori Justification Albert Casullo Oxford University Press 2003, sats 7, 136-47.

4. 2006 "Contextualism in Doubt", Croatian Journal of Philosophy VI, 197-217.

3. 2006 "Contextualism and the Structure of Skeptical Arguments", dialectica 60, 63-77.(pdf)

2. 2004 "Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or from Normativity to Constitutivity", Erkenntnis 60, 35-49.(pdf)

1. 2001 Naturalism and the Status of Epistemology Stockholm University, Department of Philosophy, Preprint Series no. 7.