PhD, Professor in Philosophy
Anandi Hattiangadi is Professor of Philosophy at Stockholm University and Pro Futura Scientia Fellow at the Swedish Collegium of Advanced Studies (SCAS). She received a BA in Philosophy from York University, Toronto, an MA in Philosophy from the University of Toronto and a Ph.D from the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge. In 2000, she took up a Research Fellowship at Trinity College, University of Cambridge, and from 2005 to 2013, she was University Lecturer at the Philosophy Faculty and Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at St Hilda’s College, both at the University of Oxford.
Hattiangadi specializes in the philosophy of mind and language, and has research interests in the philosophy of psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, meta-ethics, and philosophy of science. She is currently working on a new monograph provisionally entitled The Fundamentality of Intentionality, in which she will argue that intentionality is fundamental: the semantic properties of mental and linguistic representations – their meaning or content – do not supervene on the non-semantic.
'The Normativity of MEANING and the Hard Problem of Intentionality.' Contribution to a symposium on Allan Gibbard's Meaning and Normativity. Herman Cappelen, ed. Inquiry.
'Normativity and Intentionality'. Contribution to Daniel Star, ed. Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
'The Normativity of Meaning'. Contribution to Bob Hale, Alex Miller and Crispin Wright, eds. Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell.
2007. Oughts and Thoughts: Rule Following and the Normativity of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2015. 'Metasemantics out of Economics?' In A. Reisner and I. Hirose, eds. Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome.Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2015. 'The Limits of Expressivism.' Forthcoming in Stephen Gross, ed. Minimalism, Pragmatism, Expressivism: Essays on Language and Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2013. With Krister Byvist. 'Belief, Truth and Blindspots.' In Timothy Chan, ed. The Aim of Belief. Oxford: Oxford Univresity PRess.
2013. With Tim Bayne. In Nikolaj Nottelman, ed. New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
2013. With Corine Besson. 'The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion.' Philosophical Studies 167 (2): 251-271.
2010. 'The Love of Truth.' In Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 14 (4): 422-423.
2009. 'Semantic Normativity in Context.' In S. Sawyer, ed. New Waves in the Philosophy of Langauge. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
2007. With Krister Bykvist. 'Does Thought Imply Ought? Analysis, 67: 277-240.
2006. 'Is Meaning Normative?' Mind and Language, 21: 220-240.
2003. 'Making it Implicit: Brandom on Rule Following.' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXVI: 419-431.
September 1, 2015
Page editor: Mats Ingelström
Source: Department of Philosophy