The purpose of the conference is to explore aspects of a well-known puzzle in Aristotle’s theory of knowledge. On the one hand, his conception of scientific inquiry suggests a dialectical approach, according to which inquiry at least partly proceeds through an analysis of the credibility of the views of one’s predecessors. But on the other hand, premises in scientific proofs must express necessary truths, be universal, and be explanatory prior. The question, then, is how dialectically conceived inquiry would ever be able to offer anything like what the requirements for the premises of scientific proofs demand.

Programme:

Thursday, August 14

9.45 Welcome

Session 1, chair Gösta Grönroos (Stockholm University)

10-11.30 Robert Bolton (Rutgers University): Dialectic and Analytics: Aristotle's Two Standards for Inquiry

11.30-13 Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila (Aalto University, Helsinki): Dialectic and saving the phainomena in Aristotle

Session 2, chair Miira Tuominen (University of Jyväskylä)

14.30-16.00 Markus Wörner (National University of Ireland, Galway): Apparent enthymemes, sophistical arguments and modes of verbal deception

16.15-17.45 Jamie Dow (University of Leeds): Apparent enthymemes and the nature of Aristotelian rhetoric

Friday, August 15

Session 3, chair David Merry (Humboldt, Berlin)

9.45-11.15 Ricca Edmondsson (National University of Ireland, Galway): Twenty-first century enthymemes concerning social and political affairs: some examples related to the Rhetoric

11.15-12.45 Charlotta Weigelt (Södertörn University): Aristotelian dialectic and the Socratic art of midwifery

Session 4, chair Erik Eliasson (Swedish Institute in Rome)

14-15.30 Jakob Leth Fink (University of Copenhagen): Evaluation and truth in Topics 8.11

15.45-17.15 Hallvard Fossheim (University of Bergen): Dialectic and personal relations

 

Organised by Gösta Grönroos and Miira Tuominen.

For contact: Goesta.Groenroos@philosophy.su.se

Funded by

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